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     Abstract 
 
Using large firm-level data sets from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary,  
we show that the wage behavior of firms changed considerably as these economies launched 
their transitions to a market system. We find evidence of worker sharing in their enterprise rents 
and losses at the end of the communist period in some economies and within a year after the 
launching of the transition, we find rent sharing in all of them. Using the Czech and Slovak data 
we show that the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that existed under communism and survived 
allow for less worker rent-sharing than other firms. We also test for the presence of a wage curve 
and with the exception of Slovakia we do not find a significant association between local 
unemployment and wages. Finally, we do not find significant effects of firm ownership on 
wages.  
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1. Introduction 
Our aim in this paper is to provide a comparative empirical analysis of wage 
determination at the enterprise level in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia as 
these economies moved from central planning in a transition towards a market economy.  We use 
large panels of annual data from the late 1980’s to the 1990’s to show how wage setting in firms 
altered as the economic system changed.  Our main purpose is to explore whether workers shared 
in firm-specific rents and losses under communism and during the transition. This question is of 
interest because wages were set relatively rigidly across firms under central planning, but this 
lack of a relationship between a firm’s performance and its workers’ earnings was presumably 
waning as communism collapsed. Indeed, the issue of power of worker-insiders and firm-specific 
wage setting has arisen in many policy discussions since the start of the transition. (see e.g. 
World Bank, 1996, Barr et al 1994 and Svejnar,1997). The present paper complements Basu, 
Estrin and Svejnar’s (2004) study of employment setting in these transition economies. 
Our analysis suggests that wages did in fact vary with enterprise performance at the end 
of the communist period in Poland (where the Solidarity trade union was an important force) and 
to a lesser extent also in Slovakia (which had a more liberal and flexible political system in than  
the Czech Republic). However, there was no relationship between wages and performance under 
communism in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Yet, within a year after the launching of the 
transition, we find that worker incomes started to vary significantly with enterprise performance 
in all four Central European countries.  In this context, we have also tested for the presence of a 
“wage curve” -- variation of wages with local unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) 
and, with the exception of Slovakia, we do not find a significant association. This lack of support 
for the wage curve hypothesis is interesting in view of the wide variation in the local 
unemployment rate across districts and over time. 
The four Central and Eastern European economies in our study all experienced similar 
cumulative declines in GDP in the early 1990’s  of  between 17.5% and 20%, before growth 
resumed (see EBRD, 2003)).  However, as Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (2004) note, the countries 
responded to this output drop differently in terms of employment and wage adjustment.  In the 
Czech Republic, employment fell by 9% but real product wages by 24% from 1990-1992.  In 
contrast, employment fell by 20.5% but real wages rose in Hungary by 17%.  The figures for  
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Poland were 11% and 0.5% and for Slovakia 13.5 and 21%, respectively.  In addition to the 
decline in demand as a consequence of stabilization policies (see Aslund, Boone and 
Johnson,1996), and supply side shocks (see Blanchard and Kremer  1997), there was a sharp 
hardening of budget constraints in this period.  Subsidies to firms represented 25% of GDP in 
Czechoslovakia in 1989, compared with 12% in Hungary and 10.6% in Poland.  By the early 
1990’s, the figures was reduced to between 3% and 6% of GDP in all four economies. 
In the following section we outline our conceptual framework and estimating equations, 
and in the third section our econometric results.  Conclusions are drawn in the fourth section. 
 
2.  The Conceptual Framework and Estimating Equations 
We use Figure 1 to illustrate wage determination before and during the transition.  For 
any firm, the competitive labor market outcome is given by employment L* at point A, with the 
marginal revenue product of labor RL equaling the competitive (market clearing) wage Wc. In a 
communist system, it is argued that planners kept wages low and sought to maintain full 
employment (see Blanchard et al, 1997). Hence one can conceptualize an efficient centrally 
planned system with full employment as one that induces firms to operate at point A in Figure 1, 
with workers paid the minimum acceptable wage and planners appropriating the maximum 
profit, given by the iso-profit curve Π = Max.  
However, the communist system had been partially reformed in Hungary and Poland 
prior to transition, partly as a result of pressure from workers and managers.  It is therefore more 
appropriate to conceptualize the workings of the labor market in these economies as bargaining 
between planners, managers and workers. Depending on the preferences and relative power of 
these three parties, the wage-employment outcome could lie anywhere in the area AB'F' in 
Figure 1.
1 Points B' and F' lie on the zero profit (Π = 0) iso-profit curve and reflect the 
maximization of income per worker and employment, respectively, subject to profit being zero 
and the wage being at least Wc. The contract curve ABB', which corresponds to the short run 
labor demand curve of a profit maximizing firm, reflects outcomes with varying emphasis on 
wages and profit (no emphasis on employment), while the horizontal contract curve AFF' 
corresponds to varying degrees of joint employment and profit maximization (no emphasis on 
                     
1  See e.g., McDonald and Solow (1981) and Svejnar (1982,1986) for the underlying model.  
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wages above Wc). The outcomes C', D' and E'  on the Π = 0 iso-profit curve reflect varying 
degrees of emphasis on wages and employment (subject to zero profit).  A set of intermediate 
outcomes where the planners appropriate a given level of profit are depicted by the iso-profit 
curve Π = αMax and the corresponding points B, C, D, E, and F.  The socially efficient set of 
bargaining outcomes, corresponding to RL = Wc and various wage-profit combinations, lies on 
the vertical contract curve ADD'.  
Firms in different countries are likely to have started the transition from different wage-
employment-profit combinations and probably exhibited different original distribution of power 
among the planners, managers and workers. Moreover, depending on the form of macro 
stabilization, enterprise commercialization and privatization, the hardening of budget constraints, 
and redistribution of power among the government, managers and workers, the behavior of firms 
is likely to have evolved differently in different countries. In view of all these possible changes, 
it would be necessary to invoke very strong assumptions if one tried to identify the preferences 
of the government, managers and workers and their possible changes over time. Moreover, for 
our purposes this is unnecessary, since our goal is to assess whether wage setting behavior 
changed systematically as a result of the transition. 
  We allow for bargaining over both wages and employment, with the contract curve 
deviating from the marginal product curve of labor in relation to the weight that the bargainers 
place on employment relative to wages. In particular, following the conceptual frameworks of 
Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) and Prasnikar et al. (1994), we assume that worker preferences 
over wages and employment are given by a Stone-Geary function, 
 
U = k(W/P – W
a/P)
αL
(1-α), 
 
where W = the nominal wage, L= number of employers, P= the product price index, W
a is the 
alternative (reservation) wage, and that the management (and possibly government) is interested 
in profit 
 
π  = PQ – WL – H,  
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where H is fixed non-labor cost. A  Pareto- efficient contract that equates the marginal rate 
of substitution between wages and employment in these two objective functions (e.g., in a Nash 
bargaining context) yields the marginal revenue product condition 
 
PQL = W – γ(W – W
a), 
 
where γ = (1 − α)/α is the weight that the firm places on employment relative to wages. In the 
context of a particular production technology (e.g., CES) one can derive an employment equation 
of the form  
 
 lnL  =  βo + β1lnQ + β2X - σ(1- γ)ln(W/P) - σγln(W
a/P), (1) 
 
where σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between labor and capital.
2  Basu et al. (2004) 
estimate equation (1), following Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) in taking the alternative wage to 
be an inverse linear function of local unemployment and industry dummy variables.  
In this paper, we focus on the second equation coming out of the bargaining model, 
namely the one concerning the determination of wages.  This equation allows for the possibility 
that worker-insiders appropriate some of the enterprise-specific rents as their wages. Ideally, we 
would like to include as a regressor a variable such as net profit per worker (Svejnar, 1986), so as 
to reflect firm's rents that could potentially be appropriated by workers. Our data sets do not 
contain sufficient information to do so and we hence proxy firm’s rents by firm’s sales per 
employee (Q/L) and two-digit industry dummy variables.  The wage equation therefore reflects 
the hypothesis that, in addition to exogenous factors, wages may depend on enterprise 
characteristics, such Q/L and policy variables:  
 
  W = W(Q/L, X, Z),  (2) 
                     
2 When the firm places no weight on employment (γ = 0), the coefficient on the alternative wage is zero and the 
specification reduces to the standard labor demand equation.  When the firm places equal weight on wages and 
employment (  = 1), the coefficient on the own wage is zero and employment is driven by the alternative wage. This 
is the case corresponding to the (socially efficient) vertical contract curve ADD' in Figure 1. For   > 1, one obtains 
forward sloping contract curves such as AEE' in Figure 1.  
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where X = a vector of ownership, legal status, industry and regional variables and  Z = a vector 
of relevant structural and policy variables that may affect wages in a given firm. The most 
important variable included in the Z vector is the local unemployment rate, which is included to 
test whether it exerts a negative effect on the wage outcomes. This “wage curve” hypothesis has 
received considerable attention in the market economies (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) 
and we check if it is supported by the firm-level data during the transition from plan to market. 
We estimate equation (2) in a dynamic form, using a first degree distributed lag model on 
consecutive two-year panels of data.  The dynamic specification is desirable since the early 
transaction period was very volatile and it would be unreasonable to assume complete 
adjustment of variables within a single year.  Using consecutive two-year panels to estimate a 
series of dynamic cross-section equations is motivated primarily by the high frequency of 
enterprise entry, exit and break up in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  In fact, we would lose 
the majority of our observations if we sought to estimate across the entire period.  Using the 
short panels has the advantage that we can assess how the behavior of firms changed from the 
pre-transition period into the various phases of early transition.  For each country we therefore 
use consecutive two-year panels of data and test for the stability of coefficients across the two-
year periods. 
We specify equation (2) in loglinear form and introduce a general dynamic framework by 
allowing the left hand side variable and all the principal right hand side variables to enter in both 
current and one year lagged form.  Formally this first degree general distributed lag model is 
specified for equation (2) as  
1n (W/P)t =aO + a11n (Q/L)t + a2 1n (Q/L)t-1 
        + a3 1n Xt + a4 1n Xt-1 + a5 1n Zt +a6 1n Zt-1 + a7 1n (W/P)t-1                   (3) 
The short run elasticity of wages with respect to productivity is given by  a1 while the 
corresponding long run elasticity is given by the ratio of the two relevant polynominals in the lag 
operator, (a1 +a2)/ (1 –a7).  The short run and long run elasticity with respect to the other 
independent variables are defined analogously.  Equation (3) represents a relatively general 
model within which one can test if the appropriate specification is a) a partial adjustment model, 
a2=a4=a6=0; b) a static model a2=a4=a6=a7=0 or c) a first difference fixed effects model (a2=-a1,  
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a4=-a3, a6 = -a5 and a7 =1).  In our empirical work, we reject all the above restrictions  a) – 
c). 
 
3.  Data and Econometric Results 
We use annual data from industrial enterprises in four important transition economies: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The data were collected from records that 
enterprises were legally required to submit to their country's Statistical Offices and Ministries of 
Finance. The Czech, Slovak and Polish data sets contain almost all industrial firms with twenty 
five or more workers. Except for the small firms, these three data sets provide an almost 
complete record of the transition of industrial firms in three key transition economies. The 
drawback is that it has been impossible to obtain these data for the later years as western-style 
protection of information took place. The Hungarian data come from a panel of one thousand 
largest firms, of which about 400 are industrial firms. The latter are the firms we use in the 
present analysis.  
The data cover the period 1989-93 for the Czech Republic, 1989-92 for Slovakia, 1988-
91 for Poland and, 1988-92 for Hungary. In Poland and Hungary, the transition was launched at 
the start of 1990,
3 while in the Czech and Slovak Republics it was on January 1, 1991.  Our data 
therefore enable us to chronicle the evolution of behavior of the Czech, Slovak, Polish and 
Hungarian firms before and during the early transition. In interpreting the estimated coefficients, 
it is important to remember that the transition process started at different dates in different 
countries. For the Czech and Slovak data our estimates cover the pre-transition period of 1989-
90, the start of the transition (big bang) in 1990-91, and the early transition (1991-92 for 
Slovakia and 1991-92 as well as 1992-93 for the Czech Republic). For Poland, the estimates 
cover the pre-transition period of 1988-89, the start of the transition in 1989-90 and the early 
transition in 1990-91. Hungary had adopted many market oriented reforms already in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that the transition process accelerated in 1989 
and 1990. Our estimates cover the pre-transition period of 1988-89, the launch of transition in 
1989-90, and the early transition period of 1990-92. 
                     
3 In Hungary, the reform process dates as far back as 1968 and the transition changes that occurred at the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s were hence less fundamental than those in the other countries (see e.g., Kornai, 1995).  
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Before presenting our empirical results,  we address three additional issues related to our 
data and methodology.  First, like most large firm-level data sets, our data come in annual rather 
than quarterly or monthly frequency and annual data contain aggregation over time that 
smoothes short term changes in variables.  Second, the need to use short panels of data prevents 
us from using more than one lag of variables in our specification.  The first-degree distributed 
lag specification is limiting but this is a shortcoming that we simply cannot overcome in view of 
the severe loss of observations that we would face if we were to use longer panels of data. 
Moreover, most empirical studies of the transition labor markets do not go beyond a one-period 
lag structure. Third, while one may argue that during the planning period and during the output 
demand shock at the start of the transition the Q/L variable is exogenous to the firm, the 
Hausman test suggests that in a number of instances Q/L is endogenous to the firm decision-
making and in those instances we instrument it. The instrumental variables that we use are 
district dummy variables, two digit industry dummy variables, preceding year value of enterprise 
assets interacted with industry dummy variables, firm ownership, and the current and lagged 
average values of sales, wages, and employment of firms in the neighboring three digit, as well 
as the average value of lagged assets of firms in the neighboring three digit industry. The 
neighboring three digit industry is the next three digit industry in the relation to the industry the 
firm belongs to, within the same two digit industry classification.  In the case of the last three 
digit industry in the two-digit classification, the three digit industry classification that is the most 
similar is chosen.  The industry and regional dummy variables are used as instruments to capture 
factors such as the technical and managerial error components of the underlying production 
function (Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze, 1966). Finally, by using as instruments the average values 
of variables from firms in the nearest three-digit industry within the same two-digit 
classification, we capture the effect of common external shocks to similar sub-industries within a 
given two-digit industry, while avoiding the correlation between the error term and regressors 
that may be brought about by the firm- and three-digit industry fixed effects (Kmenta, 1997, p. 
360). 
 In Table 1 we present wage elasticities with respect to sales per worker (proxying for 
rent-sharing) and the local unemployment rate (reflecting the wage curve hypothesis). The 
elasticities correspond to the dynamic version of wage equation, which was estimated jointly  
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with an employment equation (1).
4   The estimated short-term elasticities in Table 1 
indicate that in the pre-transition Czech Republic and Hungary there was virtually no association 
between wages and sales per worker, suggesting that under communism Czech and Hungarian 
workers did not share in rents. In contrast, in Poland and Slovakia, one observes a positive 
association between wages and sales per worker in the last years of the communist regime. This 
suggests that the market-oriented reforms, observed under communism in Hungary and Poland 
but not in the Czech and Slovak Republics, were not mirrored in wages adjusting to firm-specific 
conditions. Rather, the rise of Solidarity trade union in Poland and the more liberal and flexible 
political system in Slovakia as compared to the Czech Republic appear to be associated with 
firm-specific elements of rent-sharing. In the transition period, one finds a positive short-term 
elasticity of wages with respect to sales in all four countries. To the extent that the instrumented 
sales per worker provide a good proxy for the firms’ ability to pay when industry-specific effects 
are controlled for, the estimates in Table 1 provide evidence that as soon as transition started 
workers’ wages contained a short-term link to firm-specific rents.  
The wage curve hypothesis is reflected in an expected negative coefficient on 
unemployment in the wage equation. The hypothesis receives support in Slovakia in 1991-92, 
but it is uniformly rejected in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In Poland, the coefficient is 
statistically significant and of the predicted sign in 1991, but the size of the coefficient is too 
small to be economically significant. Hence, despite the significant variation in the local 
unemployment rate, the wage curve hypothesis receives very little support from our firm-level 
data.  
While the Polish and Hungarian data sets contain almost exactly the same firms for the 
entire time period, the data from the Czech Republic and Slovakia indicate that the turnover of 
firms was considerable.  Since the latter data sets comprise virtually the entire population of 
existing firms, this turnover points to entry of new firms and the disintegration of existing ones.  
The high turnover of firms enables us to test whether the SOEs that existed before and survived 
into transition behaved differently from the population of industrial firms as a whole, i.e., 
                     
4 See Basu, Estrin, Svejnar, 2004, for details of the employment equation, which was also instrumented using the 
IVs described above.  The complete set of parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics related to this table may be 
obtained from the authors upon request.  
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including the new entrants.5   
In Table 2 we report estimates of the wage elasticities for the balanced panel of surviving 
SOEs only.  By comparing these results to those in Table 1, we can investigate whether SOEs 
that survived through the early years of transition determined wages in a different way to the 
population of firms as a whole including new firms. The wage elasticities reported in Table 2 are 
significantly smaller in both countries than those reported for all firms in Table 1. Hence in both 
Czech and Slovak firms, we find that surviving SOEs limited rent sharing more than in the entire 
population of firms.  This implies that, for a given exogenous shock, adjustment of wages was 
less in the state owned sector than in the newly formed private sector, which suggests that in the 
early transition the state was still to some extent controlling wages across the state owned firms.  
We also explored the effects of ownership and legal statues on wage determination.  At 
the macro economic level, one observes that in the 1990s some of the transition economies that 
engaged in rapid privatization (e.g. Czech republic and Russia) registered low or negative rates 
of growth while others (e.g. Lithuania and Slovakia) grew relatively fast (see Bennett, Estrin, 
Maw and Urga, 2003).  Similarly among transition countries that have proceeded slowly with 
privatization, some have grown rapidly (e.g. Poland and Slovenia) and others have had a mixed 
record (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania).  Our estimates (not reported in Tables 1 and 2), suggest that 
neither ownership nor legal status (commercialization) of firms have a systematic effect on 
wages, ceteris paribus. We tested for those effects by including a number of dummy variables for 
ownership and legal status in the wage regressions but find little systematic evidence of an 
impact from ownership or legal status on wages. We find private ownership to be associated with 
higher wages in Poland and Slovakia during the later years for which we have data on transition 
in these economies (1990 and 1991 for Poland and 1992 for Slovakia) and in the middle year 
(1992) of our transition data period in the Czech Republic. However, we find no effect of private 
ownership on wages in the Czech Republic in 1991 and 1993. Our three-country evidence hence 
indicates that private firms paid higher wages after the “big bang” (1991 in Poland and 1992 in 
the Czech and Slovak Republics), but the Czech data suggest that this effect was temporary. Our 
findings are consistent with Munich, Svejnar and Terrell’s (1999) estimates of an insignificant 
                     
5  In 1991, the surviving SOEs represented around one quarter of the Czech and one third of the Slovak firms in our 
sample. 
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wage effect of firm ownership within a human  capital earnings function in the Czech 
Republic, but not with Dobbelaere’s (2004) estimates for Bulgaria. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
Using large firm-level data sets from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary,  
we show that the wage behavior of firms displayed considerable changes as these economies 
abandoned central planning and launched their transitions to a market system. We find evidence 
of worker sharing in their enterprise rents and losses at the end of the communist period in 
Poland (where the Solidarity trade union was an important force) and to a lesser extent also in 
Slovakia (where the communist regime was more liberal and flexible than in the Czech 
Republic). However, the phenomenon is undetectable at the end of communism in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. The four sets of estimates suggest that market-oriented economic 
liberalization under communism did not uniformly extend into the labor market. Yet, within a 
year after the launching of the transition, we find that worker incomes started to vary 
significantly with enterprise performance in all four Central European countries that we study. 
We have also tested for the presence of a “wage curve” (variation of wages with local 
unemployment) and with the exception of Slovakia we do not find a significant association 
between local unemployment and wages. This lack of support for the wage curve hypothesis is 
particularly interesting in view of the wide variation in the local unemployment rates across 
districts and over time. 
The Czech and Slovak data enable us to examine whether the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) that existed under communism and survived during the transition behave differently than 
the newly created firms or firms that were spun off from the old SOEs. In both republics, the 
SOEs allow for less worker rent-sharing than other firms.  
Our final set of results relates to wage effects of enterprise ownership and legal status. 
Enterprise restructuring has been seen as a key element of a successful transition, with 
commercialization (change of a firm’s legal status) and privatization being the principal factors 
bringing about the needed restructuring.  We find that private firms in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Poland paid higher wages immediately after the start of the transition, but the 
longer-period Czech micro-data suggest that this effect dissipated later on. The lack of detectable  
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ownership effects points to the importance of examining the part played by complementary 
measures such as the introduction of effective corporate governance and competition. 
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Table 1: Wage Elasticities with Respect to Sales per Worker and Local Unemployment: 
3SLS Estimated on Unbalanced Panels 
(Values in Parentheses are Standard Errors) 
 
 1988-
89 
1989-
90 
1990-
91 
1991-92 1992-
93 
1993-94 
Czech Republic 
       
Q/L: Short-term     .027   .102
a   .437
 a   .254
a   
    (.028) (.019) (.046)  (.049)  
Q/L: Long-term     .179
a     n.a   .462
b     n.a   
   (.058)   (.226)    
Unemployment      n.a.   .034  -.303  -.237   
      (.225) (.271)  (.184)  
Slovak Republic 
       
Q/L: Short-term     .174
a   .093
a   .303
a    
    (.043) (.021) (.066)     
Q/L: Long-term     .608
c   .228
b   .060     
    (.325) (.108) (.078)     
Unemployment      n.a  -.022  -.567
c    
    (.165)  (.320)    
Poland 
       
Q/L: Short-term   .214
b   .332
a   .340
a      
  (.079) (.059) (.105)      
Q/L: Long-term   -.745   n.a.   .n.a.       
  (.564)        
Unemployment   -.009
a -.0001       
    (.002) (.002)      
Hungary 
       
Q/L: Short-term   .091   .010   .303
a   .337
a    
  (.130) (.041) (.011) (.051)     
Q/L: Long-term    n.a.   .777
a 1.331   .513
b    
    (.247) (.930) (.249)     
Unemployment       .016
b   .013
 b    
    (.006)  (.005)    
         
Notes: a,b,c = statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
n.a. = Not applicable since the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to unity. 
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Table 2: Wage Elasticities with Respect to Sales per Worker and Local 
Unemployment: 
3SLS Estimated on Balanced Panels 
(Values in Parentheses are Standard Errors) 
 
 1989-90  1990-91   1991-92   1992-93 
Czech Republic 
           
Short-term   .068
a     .130
a     .155
a 
   .085
b 
  (.013)    (.030)   (.054)   (.041) 
Long-term   .052
   -.433     .180
     .057 
  (.046)    (.541)   (.161)   (.116) 
Unemployment    n.a.     -.273    -.299    -.162 
      (.428)   (.442)   (.332) 
Slovak Republic 
           
   Sales per worker               
Short-term   .103
a     .101
a     .185
a    
  (.030)    (.023)   (.072)    
Long-term     n.a
    .650
c     .197
b    
      (.352)   (.087)    
Unemployment    n.a    -.124    -.391
b    
      (.239)   (.171)    
Notes: a,b,c = Statistically significant at 1% and 5% and 10% test level, respectively. 
n.a. = Not applicable since the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to unity 
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